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On March 15, 1971, Auguste Joseph Ricord' was indicted in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York2
as the leader of a narcotics smuggling conspiracy 3 responsible for a
sizable share of the United States drug market. Ricord, himself, was
characterized at the time by United States Attorney Whitney North
Seymour as "one of the most important, if not the most important,
source"4 of United States heroin in recent years.
Since Ricord, a French citizen residing in Paraguay, was outside
United States territory, his trial on these charges became dependent
upon the success of United States efforts to obtain his custody.5 Ac-
cordingly, the State Department on April 3, 1971, sought Ricord's pro-
visional arrest in Paraguay" and on May 24, 1971, made a formal
request for his extradition.7
The United States request was based on the 1913 Extradition
t J.D. 1970, Georgetown; LL.M. 1972, Harvard; Member of the Massachusetts and
District of Columbia Bars.
1. Ricord went by many names. He was initially indicted as Andre Ricord. Other
aliases included Andre Cori, Lucien Darguelle, and Lucien Cegelles. Affidavit of Paul
Boulad, Special Agent, United States Treasury Department, April 12, 1971, at 6, at-
tached to Indictment, United States v. Ricord, Crim. No. 71-290 (S.D.N.Y., filed March
16, 1971) [hereinafter cited as Indictment].
2. United States v. Ricord, Crim. No. 71-290 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd in open court, 478 F.2d
1397 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3352 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1973).
3. Ricord was charged with violations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 173-74 (1964), repealed, Act of
Oct. 27, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236, 1291 (conspiracy to unlawfully import,
transport and sell, or facilitate the transportation and sale of, narcotics), Indictment,
supra note 1, at 1.
4. Affidavit of Whitney North Seymour, May 20, 1971 (Application for Warrant of
Arrest), at 2, Indictment, supra note 1.
5. Government sources have indicated that the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs initially suggested that Ricord be kidnapped from Paraguay rather than formally
extradited. However, this method was strongly opposed by the United States Am-
bassador in Asunci6n and by the State Department.
Where such techniques have been used in the past, subsequent convictions of the
kidnapped offenders have been upheld by United States courts even though such abduc-
tions on foreign soil by government officials are clearly violations of international law.
See, e.g., Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886); United States v. Sobell, 142 F. Supp. 515
(S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd, 244 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 873 (1958).
See generally Cardozo, When Extradition Fails, Is Abduction the Solution?, 55 AM.
J. INT'L L. 127 (1961).
6. United States Embassy, Asunci6n, Note No. 124 (Apr. 3, 1971).
7. United States Embassy, Asunci6n, Note No. 186 (May 24, 1971).
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Treaty with Paraguay s which provided for the surrender of fugi-
tives charged with any of a list of enumerated offenses, where the
acts charged were committed within the jurisdiction of the request-
ing state and constituted a crime under the laws of both states.9 When
the Ricord extradition request came before the Paraguayan District
Court in Asunci6n, it was argued that none of these criteria had been
met. Violations of narcotics laws were not listed as treaty offenses;
Ricord admittedly had never been inside the United States but had
directed his smuggling ring from abroad; and, finally, Paraguayan
law had no counterpart to the United States statutes under which
Ricord was charged. The Paraguayan Court found for Ricord and
denied extradition.'
0
In many respects the position of the court was consistent with con-
temporary extradition practice. Indeed, it is extremely doubtful in
light of previous cases whether the United States itself would have
been willing or able to grant extradition under similar circum-
stances. Nonetheless, the official United States reaction to the Para-
guayan decision was extremely critical and the episode touched off
a campaign of some 14 months' duration during which the United
States pressured the Paraguayan government in a heavy-handed ef-
fort to overturn the lower court's decision." Whether or not the
result of these tactics, the district court's decision was reversed by
the Paraguayan Court of Appeals 12 and the request for Ricord's ex-
tradition was granted.
The Ricord affair, aside from reinforcing the Latin view that "gun-
boat diplomacy" is not dead,' 3 illustrates the complex conceptual and
practical difficulties that often arise where states are faced with
criminal conduct that transcends national boundaries.
8. Oct. 16, 1913, 38 Stat. 1754 (1915), T.S. No. 584 (effective Jan. 17, 1949).
9. Id. art. I.
10. The district court opinion is unreported. A synopsis of the decision is available
from the State Department file on the Ricord Case.
11. Among other things the United States closed down substantial lines of credit to
Paraguay. TIME, August 28, 1972, at 24.
12. Decision of August 15, 1972, copy on file at the Department of State.
13. The inference is not difficult to draw when the reaction of the United States
in the Ricord affair is compared with the attitude taken in two contemporaneous
cases in which extradition requests involving drug traffickers were refused by the
United Kingdom.
In August 1969, in the case of Egan and Hill, the United Kingdom declined to
extradite two members of an Australian based narcotics smuggling ring that was
claimed by the Department of State to have been responsible for the illegal importa-
tion of sizable quantities of heroin into the United States. Egan and Hill were charged
with violations of the same statutes involved in the Ricord request and the United
Kingdom refused extradition on the same basis as the Paraguayan lower court in
Ricord, having no counterpart to such offenses in its own law. "
On June 20, 1972, the United Kingdom also refused extradition of Jo Ann Tannehill
Ewasko charged with the illegal importation of a sizable quantity of hashish into the
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I. Overview
A. Transnational Criminal Conduct
International attitudes toward the treatment of multistate criminal
conduct remain fairly primitive. The often rigid adherence of na-
tions to ancient notions of sovereignty has substantially retarded the
development of any significant system of international criminal jus-
tice.14 Thus, the definition and punishment of crime, regardless of
its international implications, is treated primarily as a problem to
be approached at the municipal level. Yet, even here, nations are
frequently limited in their ability to deal with multistate crime
by a highly artificial understanding of prescriptive competence'r
often framed in terms of the capacity of a state to regulate particular
conduct, an ability traditionally thought to require some sovereign
connection with either the person or the activity concerned.
The Harvard Research on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime
United States. As in Ricord, this request was denied on the grounds that the acts
charged did not constitute a treaty offense.
In both Egan and Hill, and Ewasko, the matter was dropped by the United States
once extradition was denied. The description of these two cases is based upon cor-
respondence on file at the Department of State.
14. Movement in this direction has been urged periodically by scholars in the field
but little has come of it. A good general discussion of the problem can be found in
Schwarzenherger, The Problem of an International Criminal Law, 3 CURRENT LEGAL
PROBLEMS 263 (1950), reprinted in 0. MUELLER & E. WISE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw
3 (1965).
Most agreement on internationally recognized standards of criminal law has been
found in the areas of genocide and other offenses thought to be violative of the peace
and security of mankind. See, e.g., Mueller, The United Nations Draft Code of Of-
fenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind: An American Evaluation, in 0.
MUELLER & E. WISE, supra at 597. One interesting step in the direction of an interna-
tional criminal jurisprudence is the as-yet unadopted Draft Statute for an International
Criminal Court prepared under the auspices of the United Nations Commission on In-
ternational Criminal Jurisdiction in 1953, 9 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 12, U.N. Doc. A/2645
(1954). For a discussion of the Draft Statute, see Klein and Wilkes, United Nations
Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court: An American Evaluation, in 0.
MUELLER 8 E. WIsE, supra at 526. An excellent historical background is also found in"
a 1949 study of the area prepared under the auspices of the United Nations. Historical
Survey of the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction, Memorandum submitted
by the Sec. Gen., U.N. Doc. A/GN.4/7/Rev. 1 (1949).
15. The term prescriptive competence is used in this article to mean the power of
a state (or other lawful entity) to make rules that are authoritative. This usage of the
term stems from the work of Professor McDougal and his associates, although it is
used in this article in a slightly broader sense than Professor McDougal might recognize.
For a recent and eloquent statement of their position and their use of the term see
McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, Theories about International Law: Prologue to a Con-
figurative Jurisprudence, 8 VA. J. INT'L L. 188 (1968).
The term prescriptive competence intentionally contrasts with the older terms of
legislative and adjudicatory competence which were always confined to the role im-
plicit in the words. These older terms were never sufficiently descriptive, or accurate
for that matter, inasmuch as courts frequently legislate and legislatures frequently ad-
judicate. The companion term to prescriptive competence is applicative competence,
used to mean the power to apply one's law to an individual or set of individuals.
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has identified five general theories upon which states have, from
time to time, claimed prescriptive competence.
These five general principles are: first, the territorial principle,
determining jurisdiction by reference to the place where the of-
fence is committed; second, the nationality principle, determin-
ing jurisdiction by reference to the nationality or national char-
acter of the person committing the offence; third, the protective
principle, determining jurisdiction by reference to the national
interest injured by the offence; fourth, the universality prin-
ciple, determining jurisdiction by reference to the custody of
the person committing the offence; and fifth, the passive per-
sonality principle, determining jurisdiction by reference to the
nationality or national character of the person injured by the
offence.16
With the possible exception of the universality principle, all of
the above theories for the justification of prescriptive competence are
the outgrowth of notions of state sovereignty. The ability of a state
to control conduct occurring within or having a substantial effect
upon its territory; the capacity of a state to regulate the conduct of
its citizens and the power to attach consequences to behavior in-
jurious to them; the competence to protect vital national interests;
all are claimed as incidents of sovereignty. Thus, prescriptive com-
petence is thought to be allocated to national bodies, not with a view
toward the promotion of any functional concerns of the international
community at large, but rather as a result of an unyielding adherence
to sovereignty-oriented thinking.
This becomes most evident where conflicts arise between states
having concurrent jurisdiction over a particular activity. As a Re-
porter's Note in the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States points out:
16. Harvard Research in International Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29
Ams. J. INT'L L. 435 (Supp. 1935). The Harvard Research contains the following com-
ments on the five principles:
Of these five principles, the first is everywhere regarded as of primary importance
and of fundamental character. The second is universally accepted, though there
are striking differences in the extent to which it is used in the different na-
tional systems. The third is claimed by most States, regarded with misgivings in
a few, and generally ranked as the basis of an auxiliary competence. The fourth
is widely though by no means universally accepted as the basis of an auxiliary
competence, except for the offence of piracy, with respect to which it is the
generally recognized principle of jurisdiction. The fifth, asserted in some form by
a considerable number of States and contested by others, is admittedly auxiliary in
character and is probably not essential for any State if the ends served are ade-
quately provided for on other principles.
Id.
The Yale Law Journal
A state that has made its law applicable to particular conduct has
expressed a state policy with respect to that conduct. If another
state has by its law dealt in a contrary way with the same con-
duct, a conflict arises between the policies of the two states. In
this policy conflict international law is normally neutral, pro-
vided both states have bases of jurisdiction that international
law recognises. 17
As a result of this failure of international law to provide any real
guidance for the functional allocation of prescriptive competence,
states have tended to rely upon the territoriality, and to a lesser de-
gree, nationality, principles as primary bases for the assumption of
such competence. The definition and punishment by a state of con-
duct occurring within its own territory, or the conduct of its na-
tionals anywhere, is less likely to affect the interests of any other
state and thus create diplomatic difficulties.
One consequence of this fairly rigid conception of prescriptive com-
petence has been the consistent refusal by national courts to enforce
foreign penal law to punish behavior which has occurred or was fo-
cused abroad. As the United States Supreme Court explained in The
Antelope:
8
No principle of general law is more universally acknowledged
than the perfect equality of nations .... It results from this equali-
ty that no one can rightfully impose a rule on another. Each
legislates for itself but its legislation can operate on itself alone.
... The courts of no country execute the penal laws of another.19
At the same time the conventional understanding often leads to a
similar reluctance on the part of nations to apply domestic criminal
law to foreign activities in which no identifiable local interest is in-
volved. Hence a violation of foreign law is rarely assimilated to a
violation of domestic law in these cases. 20
The result is not particularly satisfying. A criminal able to place
himself outside of the territory of a state in which he has committed
a crime generally places himself beyond the reach of the law he has
17. RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 39, Re-
porter's Note 1, at 113 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
18. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825).
19. Id. at 122-23.
20. This is particularly true of common law countries. Where civil law jurisdictions
are concerned, however, there may be some movement toward a view of penal law
more in keeping with the realities of twentieth century mobility. The German Penal
Code provides one example of this approach. See 8TGB § 4(2), German Penal Code of
1871, as amended June 11, 1957 (Mueller & Buergenthal transl. 1961).
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violated. Hence, a sizable impediment to the effective regulation of
criminal activity emerges, based not on any recognizable concern of
states to protect such conduct, but rather on what is in many respects
an artificial allocation of jurisdictional competence.
The traditional solution for this particular problem has been the
device of extradition, that is, the surrender of an offender by a state
having control of him to a state jurisdictionally competent to try and
punish the offenses charged. Where narcotics crimes are concerned,
this process has become increasingly important to the United States
in recent years, 21 although, as the Ricord case indicates, its operation
has not always provided a smooth and simple answer to the problem.
B. Narcotics Offenses
Increased United States reliance upon extradition has resulted large-
ly from the growing use of United States statutes to reach narcotics
traffickers operating abroad. Prior to 1970 the government relied
principally on conspiracy statutes such as that involved in the Ricord
case.2 2 With the passage of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act of 1970,23 however, the legislative attack on foreign
based traffickers was substantially broadened.
Title III of the new statute 24 known as the Controlled Substances
Import and Export Act, deals with the international aspects of drug
control and contains those provisions intended to have extraterritorial
effect. One section in particular breaks new ground for United States
penal legislation by extending the force of United States narcotics
law to a degree not heretofore seen; that provision is § 1009. It reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture or distribute
a controlled substance in schedule I or II-
(1) intending that such substance be unlawfully imported into
the United States; or
(2) knowing that such substance will be unlawfully imported
into the United States.
21. Government sources report that United States requests for extradition based upon
narcotics violations have soared in recent years and today take up the majority of time
spent by the State Department on extradition matters.
22. See, e.g., Marin v. United States, 352 F.2d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 1965); United States
v. Eliopoulos, 45 F. Supp. 777, 779 (D.N.J. 1942). In at least one instance an alien
conspirator acting abroad has been convicted on both conspiracy and substantive counts.
See Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1967).
23. Act of Oct. 27, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified in scattered
sections of 21 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
24. 21 U.S.C. §§ 951-66 (1970).
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This section is intended to reach acts of manufacture or distri-
bution committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States. Any person who violates this section shall be tried
in the United States district court at the point of entry where
such person enters the United States, or in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia.
25
When broadly viewed, § 1009 applies to an unusually large variety
of individuals and offenses. In proscribing the manufacture and dis-
tribution of narcotics based solely upon the knowledge that such sub-
stances, or the intention that such substances, will be imported into
the United States, the section is conceivably applicable to conduct
occurring abroad regardless of both the nationality of the persons
involved and the actual effect of such activity within the United
States.2
6
The expansiveness of this new section will undoubtedly require
even wider use of extradition to bring offenders to United States
courts. Whether contemporary extradition theory and practice is ca-
pable of accommodating the approach is, however, another matter.
II. The Framework for Extradition in Contemporary Practice
Although a number of early publicists, including Grotius and
Vattel,27 had suggested that international law placed an affirmative
obligation upon states to extradite criminal offenders, the definition
and use of extradition has occurred largely through the treaty proc-
ess. 28 Thus, it is commonly recognized today that states have no ob-
ligation to extradite absent a treaty.
While a government may, if agreeable to its own constitution
and laws, voluntarily exercise the power to surrender a fugitive
from justice to the country from which he had fled, and it has
been said that it is under a moral duty to do so, . . . the legal
right to demand his extradition and the correlative duty to sur-
render him to the demanding country exists only when created
by treaty.29
25. 21 U.S.C. § 959 (1970) [hereinafter cited as § 1009]. Controlled substances are
defined and listed in 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(6), 812 (1970).
26. The provision is additionally complicated by § 1013 of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 963
(1970), which prohibits attempts or conspiracies to commit violations of title III, pre-
sumably including § 1009.
27. See, e.g., H. GRoTius, DE JuRE BELLY AS PACIs 528 (2 Carnegie Classics of Inter-
national Law transl. 1925); E. VA-TEL, LE DROIT DES GENs 212, 311-13 (1 Carnegie
Classics of International Law transl. 1916).
28. 1 J. B. MOORE, A TREATISE ON EXTRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENDITION 8-20 (1891)
[hereinafter cited as MOORE].
29. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933).
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Nevertheless, a number of states surrender fugitives, even in the ab-
sence of a treaty obligation, as an act of comity, although in some
instances domestic laws authorizing surrender are conditioned upon
factors such as reciprocity or the existence of dual criminality. At
the time of the Harvard Research in International Law the extradi-
tion law of Sweden provided, for example, that:
At the request of the government of a foreign State a person who
resides in the Kingdom and who is suspected of, charged with,
or sentenced for a crime, may be extradited to the foreign State
as provided in this law.
Extradition may take place even though the requisition in the
matter is not based upon an agreement with the foreign State,
provided, however, that unless special circumstances occasion an
exception, extradition in such cases may be granted only on the
condition that the foreign State promise to grant a requisition
made by Sweden in a similar case.30
Additionally, the following provision is found in the law of Thailand:
The Royal Siamese Government may at its discretion surrender
to foreign States with which no extradition treaties exist persons
accused or convicted of crimes committed within the jurisdiction
of such States, provided that by the laws of Siam such crimes are
punishable with imprisonment of not less than one year.31
The United States, on the other hand, is not presently able to
extradite in the absence of a treaty. As a result, the State Depart-
ment has taken the position that it will neither grant nor request
extradition as a matter of comity from governments with which the
United States has no treaty in force.
Generally, this Government does not request surrender as an
act of comity, since in the few cases where it has done so, it has
been necessary to point out to the government of the asylum
country that this Government would be unable to comply with
such a request if it should receive one. Such a statement usually
has the effect of causing the requested government to decline
surrender.3
2
30. Law Regarding the Extradition of Criminals § I (unofficial transl. in Harvard
Research in International Law, Extradition, 29 Am. J. INT'L L. 414 (Supp. 1935)).
31. Art. 4, Extradition Act B.E. 2472 (Dec. 15, 1929) (official transl. quoted in 6
M. WHITEMAN, DIcEsr OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 736 (1968) [hereinafter cited as 6
WHITEMAN]).
32. Letter from Acting Secretary of State Smith to Lester Sandles, Apr. 23, 1953,
quoted in 6 WHITEMAN 737. There may be some movement away from this position,
however. In recent years the United States has seemed more willing to request extra-
dition of narcotics offenders as a matter of comity and has had some success in this
The Yale Law Journal
There appears to be no policy justification or constitutional im-
perative that compels such rigidity. The Supreme Court has recog-
nized that, while the Executive has no inherent authority to sur-
render persons accused of crimes to requesting states, either a treaty
or an act of Congress may confer such a power.33 Nevertheless, ex-
isting United States legislation expressly requires that its provisions
relating to the surrender of persons who have committed crimes
in foreign countries shall continue in force only during the ex-
istence of any treaty of extradition with such foreign govern-
ment.34
The origin of this requirement can be traced back to 1848,35 the
year of the first federal enactment on the subject and an era in
which the United States had extradition agreements only with France
and Great Britain. Extradition has become considerably more im-
portant in the interim; yet, no effort has yet been made to bring
existing legislation into conformity with current needs.
Where the obligation to extradite is secured by treaty, such agree-
ments are traditionally of a bilateral nature, although an increasing
number of multilateral arrangements, largely on a regional basis,
have been concluded in recent years.36 Existing treaties either specify
a list of offenses for which extradition must be granted or provide
generally that for a crime to give rise to extradition it must be a
crime under the laws of the requesting and requested states, pun-
ishable generally by imprisonment in excess of a specified period. 37
With the single exception of the multilateral Montevideo Conven-
tion of 1933, 31 United States extradition treaties have been of the
regard. For example, in 1971 the United States successfully extradited Charles Laurent
Fiocconi and Jean Clude Kella from Italy for their part in a conspiracy to import
heroin into the United States in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1964) (repealed by Act
of Oct. 27, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-51, 84 Stat. 1236, 1291). Since the United States ex-
tradition agreement with Italy does not cover narcotics offenses, Italian cooperation
with the United States was accomplished as a matter of comity. See Fiocconi v. At-
torney General, 462 F.2d 475, 476-77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1059 (1972).
33. See, e.g., Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 9 (1936).
34. 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1970).
35. Act of August 12, 1848, ch. 167. § 5, 9 Stat. 303. "[T]his act shall continue in
force during the existence of any treaty of extradition with any foreign government,
and no longer."
36. An excellent example of such a bilateral approach is the European Convention
on Extradition, Dec. 13, 1957, 359 U.N.T.S. 273.
37. Id. art. 2(1).
38. Multilateral Convention on Extradition, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3111 (1936), T.S.
No. 882 (effective Jan. 25, 1935). Article 21 of the Convention provides, however, that:
The present Convention does not abrogate or modify the bilateral or collective
treaties, which at the present date are in force between the signatory States. Never-
theless, if any of said treaties lapse, the present Convention will take effect and
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list variety. The enumeration of extraditable crimes has one prin-
cipal drawback: The list of offenses can usually be changed or en-
larged only by negotiated supplementary agreements. 39 The absence
of a particular offense from the treaty list will normally preclude
extradition of offenders charged with such crimes. Indeed, this was
a major problem in the Ricord case discussed earlier.40
The United States is currently a party to extradition agreements
involving over 90 countries. 4' Of these, 56 recognize violations of
the narcotics laws as extraditable offenses. 42 In addition, the recently
signed Protocol 43 amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs44
contains the following proviso with regard to a long list of various
narcotics offenses:
(i) Each of the offences enumerated in . . . shall be deemed to
be included as an extraditable offence in any extradition treaty
existing between Parties. Parties undertake to include such of-
fences as extraditable offences in every extradition treaty to be
concluded between them.
become applicable immediately among the respective States, if each of them has
fulfilled the stipulations of the preceding article.
Id. art. 21.
The United States currently has pre-existing extradition treaties with each of the
signatories to the Convention. Thus the agreement is presently not operative for the
United States. Other parties to the Montevideo Convention are Argentina, Chile, Co-
lombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico,
Nicaragua, and Panama.
In the text and footnotes to follow all statements that indicate the number of extra-
dition treaties in force are based on U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE (1973).
39. For example, nearly half of those United States extradition treaties now having
provisions concerning narcotics offenses required amendment through this process in
order to bring narcotics crimes within their scope.
40. See p. 707 supra.
41. This figure is somewhat misleading since more than 28 countries arguably
are covered by the Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom, Dec. 22, 1931, 47
Stat. 2122 (1933), T.S. No. 849 (effective June 24, 1935), as a result of their former
status as British colonies. See note 42 infra.
42. Aside from former British colonies, such treaties exist with the following coun-
tries: Albania; Argentina; Belgium; Brazil; Canada; Colombia; Cuba (extradition not
presently available); Ecuador; France; Germany, Federal Republic of; Greece; Guate-
mala; Honduras; Iraq; Israel; Liberia; Lichtenstein; Lithuania (extradition not pres-
ently available); Luxembourg; Mexico; Monaco; New Zealand; Norway; South Africa;
Sweden; Switzerland; Spain; and United Kingdom.
Those former British Colonies to which the State Department considers the Extra-
dition Agreement with the United Kingdom applicable are: Australia; Barbados;
Botswana; Burma; Ceylon; Cyprus; Fiji; Gambia; Ghana; Guyana; India; Jamaica;
Kenya; Lesotho; Malawi; Malaysia; Malta; Mauritius; Naura; Nigeria; Pakistan; Sierra
Leone; Singapore; Swaziland; Tanzania; Tonga; Trinidad and Tobago; and Zambia.
Letter from Knute E. Malmborg, Assistant Legal Adviser for Administration and Con-
sular Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, to Raymond P. Schafer, Chairman, National Com-
mission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse, Aug. 10, 1971.
43. Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961, March 25,
1972, T.I.A.S. No. 6289 (ratified by the United States Oct. 24, 1972) (not yet in force)
[hereinafter cited as Protocol].
44. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961, March 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407,
T.I.A.S. No. 6298 (effective June 24, 1967) [hereinafter cited as Single Convention].
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(ii) If a Party which makes extradition conditional on the ex-
istence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another
Party with which it has no extradition treaty, it may at its op-
tion consider this Convention as the legal basis for extradition
in respect of the offences enumerated . . . . Extradition shall be
subject to the other conditions provided by the law of the re-
quested Party.
(iii) Parties which do not make extradition conditional on the
existence of a treaty shall recognize the offences enumerated ...
as extraditable offences between themselves, subject to the con-
ditions provided by the law of the requested Party.
(iv) Extradition shall be granted in conformity with the law of
the Party to which application is made, and . . . the Party shall
have the right to refuse to grant the extradition in cases where
the competent authorities consider that the offence is not suf-
ficiently serious.45
While this provision operates to ensure that various types of nar-
cotics offenses 46 will be recognized as extraditable crimes among the
signatories, the surrender of offenders under it must be accomplished
within the existing framework of the extradition process. In this re-
gard there exist several significant problem areas. Among these are
difficulties relating to the jurisdictional competence of the requesting
state, the characterization of the acts for which the request is made,
and the nationality of the person requested.
A. Jurisdictional Competence
As with the ability to prosecute crime generally, the capacity to
demand extradition of an offender has traditionally depended upon
the competence of a requesting state to exercise prescriptive com-
petence over the offense for which a request is made. The reasoning
is simple enough. If the conduct involved is not recognized as within
the proper regulatory sphere of a requesting state, that state cannot
validly attach penal consequences to such conduct. Where this is
the case, there is thought to be no acceptable basis upon which
extradition can be granted in light of the traditional rationale for
the process.
The concept is complicated by current treaty practice on the sub-
45. Protocol art. 14(2)(b)(i-iv).
46. Single Convention art. 36(1) lists the offenses condemned by the Convention. This
article is discussed in detail at p. 736 infra.
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ject. Since many extradition agreements require a far more restric-
tive jurisdictional nexus with the acts for which extradition is sought
than that necessary even under commonly recognized principles of
international law, extradition may not be available in a large variety
of cases even where there may be an admittedly valid basis for the
application of a requesting state's penal law to the conduct involved.
A United States request for extradition based upon § 1009 of the
Controlled Substances Import and Export Act illustrates many of
the difficulties with these rules. Since § 1009 applies to the manu-
facture or distribution of narcotics with the knowledge that such
substances, or the intention that such substances, will be unlawfully
imported into the United States, the conduct proscribed by this statute
is such that violations of it will normally occur outside the territory
of the United States.47 Whether extradition is available for offenses
based on the statute thus becomes dependdnt upon the willingness of
other nations to recognize this attempt by the United States to extend
the force of its laws abroad.
Whether an application of § 1009 to a given set of circumstances
will be recognized by other nations as an acceptable exercise of juris-
diction on the part of the United States hinges upon a number of
factors. In particular, the status of the individual and the nature
and effects of the acts involved are important considerations.
1. Application of § 1009 to United States Nationals Acting Abroad4s
Insofar as § 1009 is applied to American citizens, it can be based
upon the commonly accepted principle of prescriptive competence
that permits a state to regulate the conduct of its nationals no matter
where they be. Indeed, the statute could have gone further than it
did in the regulation of the conduct abroad of United States citizens.
It might have prohibited United States nationals anywhere in the
47. One exception would be a situation in which narcotics or other controlled sub-
stances are lawfully produced in the United States by an American manufacturer but
exported abroad with the knowledge or intent that all or a portion of the drugs in-
volved will be diverted into illicit channels and smuggled into the United States for
unlawful sale here. For the most part, however, the statute, as expressly stated, is
intended to cover foreign acts of manufacture or distribution:
This section is intended to reach acts of manufacture or distribution committed
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
21 U.S.c. § 959 (1970).
48, This section is written with traditional theories of prescriptive competence in
mind. Were the international community to allocate jurisdiction on a truly functional
basis without reference to the bias of earlier eras, it is not unlikely that principles of
jurisdiction over a nation's own nationals might be developed in line with the broader
considerations discussed in the sections which follow on jurisdiction over nonnationals.
Since this is manifestly not the case, the treatment here relies upon existing standards
and previously articulated principles.
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world from manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance,
either under certain conditions or absolutely, regardless of whether
such substances were destined for import into the United States.
The Supreme Court has recognized that such an exercise of pre-
scriptive competence is constitutionally valid as well as consonant
with generally recognized principles of international law.40 A lead-
ing case on the subject is Blackmer v. United States.50 A United
States national permanently residing in France was punished in a
contempt proceeding for failure to answer a subpoena directed to
him under a United States statute requiring citizens out of the
country to return and testify when subpoenaed in criminal cases.
On review of his conviction the Supreme Court rejected the claim
that the United States had no legislative power to impose its laws
upon nationals abroad.
While it appears that the petitioner removed his residence to
France in the year 1924, it is undisputed that he was, and con-
tinued to be, a citizen of the United States. He continued to
owe allegiance to the United States. By virtue of the obligations
of citizenship, the United States retained its authority over him,
and he was bound by its laws made applicable to him in a foreign
country. Thus, although resident abroad, the petitioner remained
subject to the taxing power of the United States. Cook v. Tait,
265 U.S. 47, 54, 56. For disobedience to its laws through conduct
abroad he was subject to punishment in the courts of the United
States. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 102.51
While the United States has not acted with any great frequency
to extend the force of its own legislation to citizens overseas, there
are a few statutes extant which do apply by their terms to the con-
duct of nationals anywhere.5 2 Moreover, in certain areas, such as
49. See, e.g., United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922) (conspiracy indictment).
50. 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
51. Id. at 436-37. As mentioned, the exercise of this extraterritorial prescriptive power
over one's own nationals is limited by international law where appropriate. For ex-
ample, an effort to enforce limitations on freedom of speech on one's national for
conduct occurring outside of his own nation is arguably unlawful based on the ex-
pectations of the world's people which underlie the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/811 (1948). More specifically most extradition
treaties exempt "political" offenses. 6 WHITEMAN, supra note 31, at 800. Article 6 of
the Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom is illustrative:
A fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered if the crime or offense in respect of
which his surrender is demanded is one of a political character, or if he proves
that the requisition for his surrender has, in fact, been made with a view to try
or punish him for a crime or offense of a political character.
Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom, Dec. 22, 1931, 47 Stat. 2122 (1933), T.S.
No. 849 (effective June 24, 1935).
52. For example, the Logan Act provides that:
Any citizen of the United States, wherever he may be, who, without authority of
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economic regulation, courts have construed statutes which do not
specifically indicate the extent of their application, but rather are
framed in broad language, to apply also to the conduct of nationals
out of the country.53 Such interpretations have been based largely on
the view that Congress intended in each act to regulate to the full
extent of its capability to do so.5 In the majority of cases, however,
United States statutes are, as indicated in Blackmer, interpreted "to
apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States," 5.
unless an extraterritorial focus is expressly indicated by the Congress
as in § 1009.
The United States approach is somewhat conservative when com-
pared to the position taken by many civil law countries which gen-
erally consider their domestic law to be binding almost in its en-
tirety on citizens abroad. The German Penal Code is illustrative
of the Continental understanding:
Sec. 3. Applicability to Germans
1. German criminal law applies to the deed of a German citi-
zen, no matter whether it was committed within Germany or
abroad.
2. German criminal law is not applicable to a deed committed
but not punishable abroad, if this deed is no offense abroad by
reason of special conditions obtaining there.
the United States, directly or indirectly commences or carries on any correspondence
or intercourse with any foreign government or any officer or any agent thereof,
with intent to influence the measures or conduct of any foreign government or of
any officer or agent thereof, in relation to any disputes or controversies with the
United States, or to defeat the measures of the United States, shall be fined not
more than .5,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 953 (1970). The statute is of 1799 vintage and may be of questionable con-
stitutional validity today in light of contemporary notions of freedom of speech and
travel. See, e.g., United States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475 (1967); Aptheker v. Secretary of
State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958). But see Zemel v. Rusk,
381 U.S. 1 (1965). For an excellent discussion of the Logan Act, including its consti-
tutional ramifications, see Vagts, The Logan Act: Paper Tiger or Sleeping Giant?, 60
A. J. INT'L L. 268 (1966). Regardless of its validity in this respect, the statute re-
mains a useful example of the extent of regulatory jurisdiction over nationals and
appears to be a reasonable exercise of legislative competence insofar as this issue is
concerned.
53. See, e.g., Steele v. Bulova, 344 U.S. 280 (1952) (trademark violation under Lanham
Act); Branch v. F.T.C., 141 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1944) (violation of Federal Trade Com-
mission Act).
54. See Steele v. Bulova, 344 U.S. at 287.
55. 284 U.S. at 437. For an interesting discussion of a recently proposed statute which
would prescribe general rules of statutory construction by specifying situations in which
broad United States statutes would specifically extend abroad, see Note, Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction-Section 208 of the Proposed New Federal Criminal Code, 13 HARV. INT'L L.J.
346 (1972).
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3. A deed is committed at every place where the perpetrator
has acted, or, in case of omission, where he should have acted,
or where the result became, or should have become, effective. 0
With nationality jurisdiction so firmly established in modern state
practice, there is good reason to believe that § 1009 of the 1970 drug
control act, at least insofar as it is applied to the extraterritorial
conduct of citizens of the United States, will be viewed on the in-
ternational level as consonant with commonly accepted principles of
prescriptive competence.
2. Application of § 1009 to Nonnationals of the United States
Acting Abroad
When directed to the conduct of nonnationals of the United States,
acting entirely outside United States territory, § 1009 presents a
somewhat more complicated question of prescriptive competence.
Although states have generally accepted the exercise of extraterri-
torial jurisdiction over nationals by their home countries, consider-
ably more reluctance has been displayed where foreign law has pur-
ported to reach the conduct of nonnationals abroad. This view stems
largely from the territorial bias toward prescriptive competence that
has dominated thinking on the subject.
The territorial view, however, has several defects. First, it pre-
supposes that criminal activity may be conveniently localized in a
single jurisdiction even at a time when technological advances make
such notions of localization increasingly unrealistic. Second, by ty-
ing conduct and consequences to a territorial regime, the legal sys-
tems artificially allocate jurisdictional competence without regard to
legitimate functional concerns that may be involved in any set of
particularized circumstances. Thus, it is becoming generally recog-
nized today that the strict territorial theory of prescriptive competence
is not adequate to meet the realities of modern society. As a result,
in recent years the strict territorial approach has been evolving to
encompass the recognized need of each state to deal adequately with
conduct which, while occurring outside of its geographic boundaries,
produces serious effects within it.
This approach has been termed "objective territorial." 57 The
56. STGB § 3, German Penal Code of 1871, as amended Aug. 4, 1953 (Mueller &
Buergenthal transl. 1961).
57. Harvard Research in International Law, Jurisdiction With Respect to Crime, supra
note 16, at 487.
The Harvard Draft Convention, unlike the Restatement formulation to be discussed
infra, provides:
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Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States has
attempted the most recent definition of the principle:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal
consequences to conduct that occurs outside its territory and
causes an effect within its territory, if either
(a) the conduct and its effects are generally recognized as con-
stituent elements of a crime or tort under the law of states
that have reasonably developed legal systems, or
(b) (i) the conduct and its effects are constituent elements
of activity to which the rule applies; (ii) the effect within
the territory is substantial; (iii) it occurs as a direct and fore-
seeable result of the conduct outside the territory; and (iv) the
rule is not inconsistent with the principles of justice gen-
erally recognized by states that have reasonably developed legal
systems.58
Section 1009 is not without problems under the Restatement ap-
proach. The principal difficulty is that the statute does not require
the prohibited conduct to occur in part or have any actual effect
within the United States.59 It acts to prohibit the manufacture or
distribution of narcotics regardless of whether any attempt is ever
actually made to import such substances into the United States, as
long as they are manufactured or distributed by a person intending
that they be, or knowing that they will be, so imported. In order
to meet the territorial requirements of the Restatement the section
might be redrafted to read:
Sec. 1009. It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture
or distribute a controlled substance in schedule I or II-
(1) intending that such substance will be unlawfully imported
A State has jurisdiction with respect to any crime committed in whole or in part
within its territory. This jurisdiction extends to
(a) Any participation outside its territory in a crime committed in whole or
in part within its territory; and
(b) Any attempt outside its territory to commit a crime in whole or in part
within its territory.
Id. at 439. It might be possible to argue that § 1009 is merely an "attempt" statute
and therefore fits into the Harvard formulation.
58. RESTATENENT, supra note 17, § 18.
59. Effects can be direct or indirect, large or small. Certainly any increase in the
supply of narcotics even without an intent to import into the United States would
have some impact in the United States by increasing world supply. But such an effect
seems insufficient to make a claim for jurisdictional competence to make and apply
law. On the other hand, manufacture with an intent to import, followed by actual
illicit importation into the United States, would constitute afi impact sufficient to give
the United States jurisdiction. For a discussion of de minimis effects versus jurisdic-
tional effects see Judge Learned Hand's opinion in United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 148 F.2d 416, 441-42 (2d Cir. 1945). The notion that an "effect" or an "impact"
can confer jurisdiction is upheld in the Lotus case to be discussed later. See pp. 723-24
infra.
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into the United States and such substances are so imported into
the United States; or
(2) knowing that such substance will be unlawfully imported
into the United States and such substances are so imported into
the United States.
Whether this approach is necessary remains to be determined. The
understanding that prescriptive competence when based on the ob-
jective territorial principle always demands some sort of territorial
nexus may not be entirely justified by existing practice.
A decision that is particularly interesting in this regard is Lauritzen
v. Larsen.60 In Lauritzen Justice Jackson in a lengthy opinion con-
sidered the applicability"' of American maritime law to Larsen, a
Danish seaman, injured in the course of his employment while his
ship, a Danish vessel owned by a Dane, was in port at Havana, Cuba.
There were only two "contacts" between these events and the forum
United States. First, Larsen had signed on to the ship when it was
in New York harbor. The ship's articles did, however, specifically
provide that the contract of employment would be interpreted in
accordance with Danish law. Second, the ship regularly came to
the United States.
It appeared that under the laws of Denmark, Larsen was, or at
least could have been, compensated under a scheme analogous to
American workmen's compensation. 62 If United States law were ap-
plied,63 however, Larsen would have recovered damages for his in-
jury based upon the fault principle of tort liability in accordance
with the Jones Act. The district court applied United States law
and awarded the plaintiff $4267.5064 damages and the Second Cir-
cuit affirmed.6 5
In a studied opinion Justice Jackson rejected the notion that a com-
plex matter, such as that raised by Larsen's claim, could be resolved
by reference to one single principle or policy of national or inter-
national law. 66 Rather, the task of a court in such matters was, as Jus-
60. 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
61. Other instances of the application or attempted application of forum law to
foreign nationals can be found in the context of cases interpreting economic regulatory
statutes. See generally H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 829-1028
(1968). See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690
(1962).
62. 345 U.S. at 575-76.
63. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
64. 345 U.S. at 573.
65. Larsen v. Lauritzen, 196 F.2d 220 (2d Cir. 1952).
66. 345 U.S. at 583.
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tice Jackson saw it, the reconciliation of the various national interests
involved with a view toward "accommodating the reach of [United
States] laws to those of other maritime nations."67 Thus, Justice Jack-
son selected and considered various connecting factors6 s arising from
the facts of the case and concluded that the interest of the United
States in regulating the transaction was not sufficient to support an
assumption of jurisdiction. 9
Jackson's approach and the approach followed by other courts since
the end of World War II suggest that any single contact or terri-
torially oriented nexus is at once too narrow and too broad a basis
for jurisdiction.70 Rather an assumption of prescriptive competence
by a state requires an analysis of wider considerations stemming both
from the legitimate interests of the nations concerned as well as
the demands of the international order.
Illustrative of this position is the opinion of the Permanent Court
of International Justice in the Case of the S.S. "Lotus."71 In the
Lotus, the Permanent Court set out to determine the position of
international law on the subject of penal competence. In so doing
it described two possible approaches to the question:
This situation may be considered from two different standpoints
corresponding to the points of view respectively taken up by the
Parties. According to one of these standpoints, the principle of
freedom, in virtue of which each State may regulate its legisla-
tion at its discretion, provided that in so doing it does not come
in conflict with a restriction imposed by international law, would
also apply as regards law governing the scope of jurisdiction in
criminal cases. According to the other standpoint, the exclusive-
ly territorial character of law relating to this domain constitutes
a principle which, except as otherwise expressly provided, would,
ipso facto, prevent States from extending the criminal jurisdic-
tion of their courts beyond their frontiers; the exceptions in
question, which would include for instance extraterritorial juris-
diction over nationals and over crimes directed against public
safety, would therefore rest on special permissive rules forming
part of international law.72
67. Id. at 577.
68. Id. at 583-91.
69. Id. at .593.
70. For an example of an approach that is similar to Jackson's see the opinion of
judge Herlands in Air Lines Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 173 F. Supp. 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). See also Naim Molvan v. Attorney General for
Palestine, [1948] App. C. 351 (P.C.) (Palestine).
71. [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9.
72. Id. at 20.
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Of the two views presented, the Court effectively chose the first,7 3
thus adopting the position that, in the absence of any explicit al-
location of legislative competence within the international com-
munity, states may exercise prescriptive competence where local in-
terests demand, providing they do not infringe upon interests of
other states protected under customary international law.
If this understanding is accepted, and indeed it has been criti-
cized,74 the principal consideration, where an assumption of penal
jurisdiction is questioned, should not be whether a territorial nexus
with the conduct exists, but rather whether the regulating state has
a substantial interest in the subject matter and whether such juris-
diction is consonant with the legitimate regulatory concerns of other
states involved. Where the interests of states in the suppression of
certain conduct are consistent, penal competence might reasonably be
asserted by a state based upon factors other than the existence of a
tangible effect within its territory from the conduct prohibited. In this
type of case, intent or knowledge, such as that required by § 1009,
could suffice to provide a sufficient concern upon which prescriptive
competence might be exercised.75
Viewed in this light, there may be a reasonable basis in interna-
tional law for the application of § 1009 to the manufacture and dis-
tribution of certain narcotic substances by persons intending that
they be, or knowing that they will be, unlawfully imported into
the United States, even though such persons are aliens acting abroad
and such importation fails to occur. The interest of the United
73. Id. at 21.
74. See, e.g., Berge, The Case of the S.S. "Lotus," 26 MICH. L. Rdv. 361 (1929); Brierly,
The 'Lotus' Case, 44 L.Q. Rav. 154 (1928).
75. Indeed it was a similar recognition of such a catholicity of interest on the
part of states that was responsible for the development of the now commonly ac-
cepted principle of universal jurisdiction over the crime of piracy.
The jurisdiction of the State to prosecute and punish for piracy juris gentium
though committed outside the territory is everywhere recognized. Most of the prin-
cipal maritime States have enacted legislation making piracy a special ground of
jurisdiction, while in other States it is included in a more comprehensive com-
petence which the State asserts over various offences committed by aliens abroad.
The principle is one of universality. The piratical act need not have been com-
mitted within the territorial jurisdiction of the State. The pirate need not be a
national or one assimilated thereto. If the crime is one "which constitutes piracy
by international law" the competence to prosecute and punish may be founded
simply upon a lawful custody of the person charged with the offence. jurists who
have written on the jurisdiction of crime are practically unanimous in affirming the
competence.
Harvard Research in International Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, supra note
16, at 563-64.
If the illicit traffic in narcotics is properly understood to affect the universal con-
cern of nations in a manner similar to piracy there should be little by way of a con-
ceptual obstacle to prevent its prosecution by states based on the kind of concerns
expressed in § 1009-a basis considerably more limited than the universality approach.
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States in prohibiting this conduct can be based upon the not un-
reasonable view that the manufacture and distribution of narcotics
with the United States in mind creates a sizable reservoir of drugs,
some of which ultimately must find their way onto the United
States market. The prosecution of primary manufacturers and dis-
tributors having the requisite knowledge or intent thus becomes
important, whether their activity can be shown to result in actual
import into the United States customs territory or not. Finally, in
view of the expressed concern of states that narcotics trafficking in
general be suppressed, it does not appear that any regulatory in-
terest of other nations conceivably involved is impaired by the ex-
ercise of jurisdiction over such conduct.
Although not strictly analogous the various war crimes trials after
World War II reveal that at least with regard to so-called interna-
tional crimes any responsible member of the world community has
the competence to try a war criminal regardless of national status or
location of the acts charged. In In re Yamashita6 the United States
Supreme Court upheld the jurisdiction of an American military tri-
bunal to try the former Japanese commander in the Philippines for
crimes committed primarily against the civilian inhabitants of the
Philippines in addition to crimes against prisoners of war. The Nur-
emberg Judgment and the Eichmann trial are further evidence of this
practice. 77
Of course the war crimes trials were supposedly trials of interna-
tional crimes. This does not render these cases inapplicable to § 1009
offenses. The Single Convention of 1961 is notice, indeed perhaps bet-
ter notice, to international offenders of world expectations on the mat-
ter of narcotic drugs than General Yamashita ever had of his respon-
sibility for the actions of his subordinates.
Indeed the Single Convention of 1961 did come close to defining
the manufacture and distribution of narcotic drugs as an international
crime, permitting universal penal competence in the area. This ap-
proach was considered at length at the 1961 Conference, convened by
the United Nations Economic and Social Council for the purpose of
considering the Single Convention." Among the proposals received
76. 327 U.S. 1 (1964). But see the dissenting opinions of Justice Murphy, id. at 26,
and Justice Rutledge, id. at 41.
77. See Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German
Major War Criminals, Nuremberg, Sept. 30-Oct. 1, 1946, reprinted in 41 Am. J. INT'L L.
172 (1947); H. ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEm; A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL
(1964).
78. See note 44 supra. The Conference was attended by some 77 nations and met
in New York from January 24 to March 25, 1961. The Single Convention was its Final
Act.
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by the Conference was the following section concerning the enforce-
ment of narcotics laws:
serious offenses committed abroad either by nationals or by
foreigners shall be prosecuted by the state in which the offender
might be found if otherwise the offender might escape prosecu-
tion.79
Although the Conference undoubtedly was of the sentiment that
serious offenders should not escape prosecution, the proposed sec-
tion was criticized by some delegates. For example, the Indian rep-
resentative was of the view that the proviso
was contrary to the normal principle of criminal jurisprudence
that an offender should be punished in the country where the
crime was committed. Under Indian law, it would not ordinarily
be possible to punish an alien in India for a crime committed
outside the country. He expressed the hope that that provision
would be deleted.80
As a result of this and other criticism, the proposal was eventually
abandoned.81
There was certainly no reason from a legal standpoint why the
Conference could not have applied the universality approach to il-
licit trafficking. Seventy-three nations acting in convention are quite
capable of altering international jurisdictional principles. Moreover,
since the Conference had already defined with reasonable clarity the
offenses it considered worthy of prohibition,8 2 it would have been
simple enough to limit the assumption of universality jurisdiction
to these particular acts. The fact is that the Conference chose not to
do so. Nonetheless, the decision to leave prosecutorial competence in
the hands of the individual states cannot be used as evidence to deny
those same states criminal jurisdiction in appropriate circumstances;
nor should the result of the Conference's deliberations be utilized
79. See 2 Official Records, United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs (Jan. 24 to Mar. 24, 1961), U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 34/24, at
17 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Official Records].
80. See 1 Official Records, supra note 79, at 126. A similar position was taken by
the Norwegian delegate who stressed that
[t]he territorial principle generally prevailed in international criminal law; he
could accept the principle of universality only in a limited number of cases, such
as piracy on the high seas.
See 2 id. at 233.
81. It is interesting to note that one of the stronger critics of the proposal was the
delegate from the United States. See, e.g., 1 id. at 123.
82. See Single Convention, supra note 44, art. 36(1). The section is quoted at p. 736
infra.
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to reaffirm outmoded concepts of territoriality and sovereignty where
narcotics crimes are concerned. If the requirement of a territorial
nexus is recognized as having its functional basis in the desire to
ameliorate international tension where divergent regulatory views
conflict, the absence of such conflict should serve to lessen the need
for the requirement.
3. Treaty Standards for Jurisdictional Competence
Assuming, arguendo, that § 1009, even as broadly construed, will
be recognized as a permissible exercise of prescriptive competence on
the part of the United States, it remains to be determined whether
current treaty practice is capable of subsuming such a construction.
As indicated earlier the ability of the United States to extradite or
request extradition has in the past been determined solely by its
treaties on the subject. Each of these extradition agreements con-
tains its own jurisdictional requirements and such requirements often
differ in scope from treaty to treaty. As will be seen these requirements
are often considerably more stringent than those necessary for the exer-
cise of prescriptive competence under public international law gen-
erally.
Requirements of prescriptive competence are expressed in exist-
ing United States extradition treaties in a number of ways. Some
agreements, such as the recent treaty with New Zealand,8 3 permit
extradition only where the acts of the accused were committed with-
in the territory of the requesting state.
Each Contracting Party agrees to extradite to the other, in cir-
cumstances and subject to the conditions described in this Treaty,
persons found in its territory who have been charged with or
convicted of any of the offences mentioned in Article II of this
Treaty committed within the territory of the other.
A reference in this Treaty to the territory of a Contracting Party
is a reference to all the territory falling under the jurisdiction
of that Contracting Party, including territorial waters, and the
airspace thereover belonging to or under the control of one of
the Contracting Parties, and vessels and aircraft belonging to one
of the Contracting Parties, or to a citizen or corporation thereof
when such vessel is on the high seas or such aircraft is over the
high seas .... 84
83. Extradition Treaty with New Zealand, Jan. 12, 1970, [1971] 22 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S.
No. 7035 (effective Dec. 8, 1970).
84. Id. arts. I III.
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Others, while expressing a territorial bias, provide for extradition for
crimes based upon acts not actually occurring within the territory of
the requesting state under certain circumstances. The newly nego-
tiated agreement with Argentina 5 is illustrative of this approach.
The Contracting Parties agree to extradite on a reciprocal basis
to the other, in the circumstances and subject to the conditions
established in this Treaty, persons found in the territory of one
of the Parties who have been charged with or convicted by the
judicial authorities of the other of the offenses mentioned in
Article 2 of this Treaty committed within the territory of such
other, or outside thereof under the conditions specified [below].
When the offense for which extradition has been requested has
been committed outside the territory of the requesting Party,
the executive authority of the United States or the judicial au-
thority of the Republic of Argentina, as appropriate, shall have
the power to grant extradition if the laws of the requested State
provide for the jurisdiction over such an offense committed in
similar circumstances.86
Finally, a number of treaties of earlier vintage, such as that with
Ecuador,87 provide as follows:
The Government of the United States and the Government of
Ecuador mutually agree to deliver up such persons as may have
been convicted of or may be accused of the crimes set forth in
the following article, committed within the jurisdiction of one
of the contracting parties, and who may have sought refuge or
be found within the territory of the other, it being understood
that this is only to be done when the criminality shall be proved
in such manner that, according to the law of the country where
the fugitive or accused may be found, such persons might be
lawfully arrested and tried, had the crime been committed within
its jurisdiction.8 8
It would seem that of all these treatments of jurisdictional com-
petence to demand extradition, the last allows the widest latitude.
It would permit the surrender of offenders for any extraditable of-
fense falling within the parameters of prescriptive competence under
international law.
85. Extradition Treaty with Argentina, Jan. 21, 1972, T.I.A.S. No. 7510 (effective
Sept. 15, 1972).
86. Id. arts. I & 11.
87. Extradition Treaty with Ecuador, June 28, 1872, 18 Stat. 199 (1875), T.S. No. 79
(effective Dec. 24, 1873).
88. Id. art. I.
Vol. 83: 706, 1974
Traffic in the Traffickers
The liberality of the language of the Ecuadorian treaty is not in-
dicative of prevailing practice. In a number of cases both foreign
offices and courts have interpreted the word "jurisdiction" to mean
jurisdiction in a territorial sense, thus equating it with boundaries.89
A recent example of such a case occurred in 1971. It involved a
United States request to the United Kingdom for the extradition of
two American citizens, Irene and Charles Terhune.
The Terhunes had been indicted in the Central District of Cali-
fornia on February 17, 1971,90 for multiple counts of fraud91 and
bribery of a United States official. 92 These charges stemmed from
their participation in the widely publicized Army open mess scandal
and were based on acts that had occurred entirely outside the ter-
ritory of the United States. When the Terhune extradition request
came before the Bow Street Magistrates Court,93 the question was
raised whether extradition was available under the 1931 Extradition
Treaty with Great Britain94 in view of the language of the agree-
ment requiring that the acts charged be committed "within the juris-
diction"9' 5 of the requesting state.
Counsel for the United States argued that this language required
only that the activity for which extradition was sought be within the
prescriptive competence of the state seeking extradition as delineated
by commonly accepted principles of international law. The court
did not accept this view. The magistrate hearing the case, while of
the opinion that the application of United States law to the Terhunes
would be a valid exercise of legislative jurisdiction on the part of
the United States under this standard, concluded that the treaty re-
quired more. The court interpreted the treaty language as neces-
89. See, e.g., 6 WHITEMAN, supra note 31, at 899-904. The concept of territory in-
cludes affiliated ships on the high seas and any crimes committed on them. For an
example of a case where the crime was committed on the high seas but the flag had to
request extradition by the nation of the ship's next port of call, see R. v. Gov. of
H.M. Prison Brixton, Ex Parte Minervini, [1958] 3 All E.R. 318.
90. United States v. Terhune, Crim. No. 71-7500 (C.D. Calif., filed Feb. 17, 1971).
91. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970).
92. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1970).
93. The Bow Street Magistrates Court is generally the court of jurisdiction for
extradition hearings in England. See Extradition Act of 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., c. 52, §§ 9,
26; Extradition Act of 1895, 58 9: 59 Vict., c. 33, § 1. While there is some confusion
in the area, appeals by requesting states from a refusal by a magistrate to commit
an individual for extradition do not appear to be permissible. See United States v.
Atkinson, [1963] 3 W.L.R. 1074, 1089 (H.L.). There are a number of advantages in
having one court charged with the responsibility of hearing extradition matters, par-
ticularly since this subject requires a certain amount of expertise. Nevertheless, no
similar centralization exists in the United States.
94. Treaty of Extradition with Great Britain, Dec. 22, 1931, 47 Stat. 2122 (1933),
T.S. No. 849 (effective June 24, 1935).
95. Id. art. 1.
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sitating a showing that the acts charged actually occurred within
the physical territory of a requesting state. Extradition was denied."3
The decision should not have come as a great surprise to the
United States. The State Department has interpreted this type of
treaty clause in the same manner as the English court did. One
example of such a case is described by Hackworth:
Ignacio Moran, while Mexican Consul at Berlin, was said to
have embezzled funds belonging to the Mexican Government.
When he was found in New Orleans a request was made for his
provisional arrest and detention with a view to his extradition
to Mexico. The Mexican Government took the position that as
the offense was committed in the discharge of the official duties
of a Mexican Consul it was beyond doubt committed within the
jurisdiction of the United Mexican States within the meaning
of article I of the convention of 1899 between the United States
and Mexico (ante). The Secretary of State was of the opinion
that the word jurisdiction as contained in the convention re-
ferred to places under the sovereign power of the contracting
parties and that therefore Moran's offense was not committed
within the jurisdiction of Mexico. 7
There is no discernible policy reason for such a restrictive construc-
tion of the term "jurisdiction," especially in light of the goals that
extradition is designed to achieve.
This view seems, however, presently to be in a state of flux.
For example, United States State Department officials currently con-
tend that, regardless of past cases, they no longer adhere to the re-
strictive interpretation of the term "jurisdiction" where extradition
is requested from the United States, although there is little by way
of concrete evidence to support the claim. Moreover, in at least one
instance, the United States has obtained extradition of an offender
based on a liberal interpretation of such a jurisdictional require-
ment. Whiteman describes the case:
[I]n 1965 the United States requested the extradition from Aus-
tria, under the United States-Austrian Extradition Treaty of
1930 . . ., of a United States soldier who was charged by United
States military authorities with the robbery of an American Ex-
press Company safe at a United States military base at Berchtes-
96. The opinion is unreported. A synopsis of the decision is available from the
State Department file on the Terhune case.
97. 4 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEsT OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 70 (1942) (emphasis in original)
[hereinafter cited as HACKWoRTH].
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-aden, Germany, and who was arrested by Austrian authorities
for offenses subsequently committed in Austria. Germany did
not seek to assert jurisdiction to try the accused for the robbery.
The Treaty of 1930 provides for extradition for crimes "com-
mitted within the jurisdiction of one of the High Contracting
Parties, whenever such person shall seek an asylum or shall be
found within the territories of the other." Extradition was
granted by Austria and the accused was delivered to United
States military authorities at the Austria-German border.98
The limitations upon extradition imposed by the various treaty
approaches to prescriptive competence obviously present substantial
problems where a request is based upon a violation of § 1009 of
the 1970 drug control act. Under the strict territorial standard used
in treaties such as the New Zealand agreement9" it does not ap-
pear that requests under § 1009 could be granted, although the
Ricord case presents an exception in this regard.100 The same would
result under the unreasonably narrow construction often applied to
the term "jurisdiction" as used in treaties such as that with Ecua-
dor 10 ' although there is room for a more liberal interpretation here.
It is only under the more recent approach, exemplified by the agree-
ment with Argentina, 10 2 that the possibility of extradition for a § 1009
offense appears slightly more likely. Yet even here difficulties are
certain to arise.
The Argentine treaty, in providing for discretionary extradition
in respect of offenses committed abroad "if the laws of the requested
State provide for the jurisdiction over such an offense committed
in similar circumstances,' 0 03 utilizes a standard that, of course, must
vary from case to case. However, in treaties taking this direction it
should be possible, in some instances, to extradite United States citi-
zens accused of violations of § 1009. The bulk of civil law juris-
dictions, as indicated earlier, tend to apply their penal codes to
offenses of nationals everywhere. Thus, a request involving the sur-
render of a United States citizen could meet the requirement of
similar jurisdictional treatment embodied in the formula established
by the Argentine Treaty, providing offenses in the nature of those
98. 6 WHIrEMAN, supra note 31, at 896-97.
99. See note 83 supra.
100. See p. 707 supra.
101. See p. 728 supra.
102. See note 85 supra.
103. Extradition Treaty with Argentina, Jan. 21, 1972, T.I.A.S. No. 7510, art. III
(effective Dec. 24, 1973).
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prohibited by § 1009 are recognized in the criminal law of the
country involved. 104
On the other hand, where the violation concerns the activity of
an alien acting abroad, a somewhat greater problem arises. In this
case all of the arguments applicable to the exercise of prescriptive
competence are likely to arise in each entity framing laws for the
treatment of extraterritorial conduct. Thus some states may, and
others may not, assume jurisdiction in similar circumstances. Indeed,
of those that do so, many may limit the application of their laws
only to such offenses actually having an effect within their territory.
As a result, the ability of the United States to utilize the extradi-
tion process to secure the prosecution of these § 1009 offenders is
at best uncertain, even under most recent attempts to revitalize ex-
isting extradition machinery.
It is only in respect of those countries exercising universal penal
jurisdiction over narcotics traffickers, 10 5 that the extradition of § 1009
offenders would be accomplished most easily within the parameters
established by the Argentine Treaty. For example, the Argentine
formula would likely encompass nearly all violations of § 1009, even
under a broad reading, where the Federal Republic of Germany was
the requested state because of the treatment of narcotics offenses by
the German Penal Code:
Regardless of the law of the place of commission, the German
criminal law is applicable to the following offenses committed
by a foreigner abroad: . . .
(8) unlawful narcotics traffic;' 016
Nevertheless, the broad approach of the German code is not widely
followed. Hence, the availability of extradition for an alien engaged
in activity prohibited by § 1009 remains a conspicuous problem even
under most recent formulations of extradition standards. Where the
great majority of existing United States agreements are concerned,
the extradition of violators of § 1009 may be unavailable, not only
for aliens, but United States citizens as well-thus rendering the sec-
tion practically unenforceable.
104. This problem of characterization is discussed in detail beginning at p. 733
infra.
105. At the 1961 United Nations Conference which considered and adopted the
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, a proposal was advanced which would have
treated narcotics crimes as universally punishable in much the same way as piracy.
The proposal was not adopted, however. For discussion of this aspect of the Con-
ference, see pp. 725-26 supra.
106. STGB § 4(3)(8), German Penal Code of 1871, as amended June 11, 1957 (Mueller
& Buergenthal transl. 1961).
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While it is possible to develop a new treaty standard for extradi-
tion that might obviate the difficulties posed by these often arti-
ficial jurisdictional barriers, some additional problems need considera-
tion before a thorough reevaluation of the process is practicable.
B. Characterization of the Acts for Which Extradition is Requested
1. In General
Characterization plays a prominent part in extradition matters large-
ly as a result of the requirement of dual criminality, a significant
aspect of extradition procedure. A state from which extradition is
asked will rarely honor such a request if the acts upon which the
request is founded are not recognized by it as criminal in its own
system. This dual criminality principle derives from a variety of
social policies: strong preferences for the application of local stand-
ards; distrust of foreign expressions of public policy; and notions
of reciprocity. Thus, in each case where extradition is at issue,
it becomes necessary to ascertain whether the particular conduct
charged can be successfully characterized as a crime under both the
laws of the requesting and requested states. This requirement of
dual criminality is expressed in virtually all contemporary extradi-
tion treaties either by a precise statement of the standard'" or through
the use of a list of named offenses. 10 8
As indicated earlier, the enumerative or "list" treaty is the pre-
vailing form of agreement in United States treaty practice. While
the use of this method can lead to a fair amount of inflexibility and
may often preclude extradition in those cases where a particular
crime is not found in the list of treaty offenses, 09 it does have the
advantage of establishing with some specificity the areas of conduct
which the parties generally agree will constitute a crime in their
various jurisdictions. Yet, even here, problems of interpretation often
arise.
Since every nation's criminal law is ultimately the result of its own
107. See p. 714 supra.
108. Because of the nature of the enumerative or "list" type agreement, a precise
statement of the dual criminality standard is relatively rare in such treaties, although
such clauses can occasionally be found. For example, the Extradition Treaty with
Iraq while containing a list of offenses provides as well that:
Persons shall be delivered up according to the provisions of this Treaty, who shall
have been charged with or convicted of any of the following crimes if they are
punishable by the laws of both countries ....
Extradition Treaty with Iraq, June 7, 1934, 49 Stat. 3380 (1936), T.S. No. 907 (effective
Apr. 23, 1936).
109. See p. 715 supra.
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perception of the social and political needs of the community, a fair
degree of difference exists in the penal laws of various countries. Thus,
even where the parties to an enumerative agreement fix certain of-
fenses as extraditable in the abstract, the elements of these particular
offenses can differ significantly from country to country. As a result,
certain acts may be characterized as constituting a treaty offense in
one state while the same acts may constitute no crime at all in another,
or if unlawful, may constitute an entirely different offense."10
Where narcotics crimes are concerned, United States treaties con-
tain a variety of definitions. For example, some, such as the 1931
agreement with Greece,"' provide merely for extradition for "crimes
or offenses against the laws for the suppression of traffic in narcot-
ics."11 2 Others, such as the 1961 agreement with Brazil," 3 provide
more specifically for the extradition of individuals charged with
"crimes or offenses against the laws relating to the traffic in, use of
or production or manufacture of narcotic drugs or cannabis.
'""14 Still
others, such as the 1962 agreement with Israel, 1 5 speak only of "of-
110. An example of the interpretative problems that can arise under such a statute
has occurred in connection with the offense of rape. While most treaties to which the
United States is a party include rape as an extraditable offense, they do not define
the term with any degree of particularity. Whiteman describes a case in which this
kind of abstract definitional usage has led to a difference in interpretation. 6 WHnrEMAN.
supra note 31, at 776-77.
In 1951 the American Embassy in Canada had occasion to inquire of the Canadian
Department of External Affairs whether the crime of statutory rape under New York
law would be considered as an extraditable offense by Canada under the then-existing
extradition agreement between the two countries. The Embassy reported that:
The [Canadian] Department of Justice has informed us that the crime of second
degree rape, or statutory rape as defined in the New York statutes, is not in all
cases an extraditable crime in Canada. They point out that where the crime of
rape in New York is also a crime under Canadian law then it would be an ex-
traditable crime. But where an act which constitutes a crime of rape in New York
law, is not rape under Canadian law it would not be looked upon as an extra-
ditable crime by the Canadian authorities.
An example of when the offence might be considered to be an extraditable
crime in Canada is when a person carnally knows a girl under the age of four-
teen years, or carnally knows any girl of previous chaste character under the age
of sixteen and over the age of fourteen years, not being his wife. On the other
hand, an example of what Canadian law would consider to be a non-extraditable
crime, would be the case where a girl, bein& over the age of fourteen years and
under the age of sixteen years, but not having a previous chaste character, con-
sents to the act. Another example of a non-extraditable crime would be in the
case of a girl over the age of sixteen years and under the age of eighteen years
who consents to the act.
Dispatch No. 1447, American Embassy, Ottawa, to the Department of State (May 9,
1951), quoted in 6 WHITEMIAN, supra note 31, at 776-77. Extradition with Canada was,
at the time, carried on under the Extradition Treaty with Great Britain.
1ll. Extradition Treaty with Greece, May 6, 1931, 47 Stat. 2185 (1933), T.S. No.
855 (effective Nov. 1, 1932).
112. Id. art. 11(26).
113. Extradition Treaty with Brazil, Jan. 13, 1961, [1963] 15 U.S.T. 2093, T.I.A.S.
No. 5691 (effective Dec. 17, 1964).
114. Id. art. 11(27).
115. Extradition Treaty with Israel, Dec. 10, 1962, [1962] 14 U.S.T. 1707, T.I.A.S.
No. 5476 (effective Dec. 5, 1963).
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fenses against the laws relating to dangerous drugs." 116 Regardless
of the definitional approach used, the difference in the treatment of
drug offenses in various national systems, especially where importa-
tion is involved, is bound to lead to some interpretive confusion. An
excellent illustration of the difficulties that can arise occurred re-
cently in an extradition request directed to the United Kingdom
for the surrender of Jo Ann Tannehill Ewasko.
Ewasko was indicted in the United States District Court for
the District of Massachusetts on September 30, 1971,117 for unlaw-
ful importation into the United States of a huge quantity of hash-
ish.1" s The indictment charged that Ewasko had been one of two
individuals who attempted to claim a trunk shipped from abroad
which, during the process of customs inspection, was found to contain
the drug. Ewasko was able to escape capture and fled to the United
Kingdom. When her whereabouts was discovered, the United States
requested extradition. 1" 9
The extradition request was based upon the 1931 agreement with
Great Britain 120 which listed as a treaty offense:
Crimes or offences or attempted crimes or offences in connec-
tion with the traffic in dangerous drugs.
121
In reply to the United States extradition request, Her Majesty's Prin-
cipal Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs ex-
plained that the illegal importation of dangerous drugs, such as
occurred in the Ewasko case, was not an offense in English law
against any enactment relating to dangerous drugs, but rather was
an offense in violation of the Customs and Excise Act; thus, it was
not an extraditable crime within the meaning of the treaty, customs of-
fenses not being included in the treaty list.122 As a result, the re-
quest was denied.
The English approach to the problem of characterization, as ex-
emplified by the Ewasko case, is somewhat less than enlightened.
Such a restrictive reading of treaty requirements serves no good pur-
pose if effective enforcement of multinational narcotics laws is the
116. Id. art. 11(31).
117. United States v. Ewasko, Crim. No. 71-471 (D. Mass., filed Sept. 30, 1971).
118. Ewasko was charged under Act of July 18, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-728, § 106, 70
Stat. 570.
119. United States Embassy, London, Note No. 12 (June 1, 1972).
120. Extradition Treaty with Great Britain, Dec. 22, 1931, 47 Stat. 2122 (1933), T.S.
No. 849 (effective June 24, 1935).
121. Id. art. 3(24).
122. United Kingdom, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Note No. 304 (June 20,
1972).
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goal. Nonetheless, this pecksniffian view is not unique in extradition
matters, and, absent any movement toward uniformity in national
criminal legislation, is an attitude likely to continue.
One development that may tend to alleviate this problem to some
degree, at least insofar as drug enforcement is concerned, is the 1961
Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs.123 The Single Convention
obligates its signatories to enact generally uniform legislation with
respect to narcotics control. For example, it provides that the parties
shall require the licensing of both private manufacture124 and dis-
tribution 125 of narcotic substances and "shall not knowingly permit
the export of drugs to any country . . . except ... [i]n accordance
with the laws and regulations of that country .. .. 1 -6Moreover, the
Convention obligates the parties to:
adopt such measures as will ensure that cultivation, production,
manufacture, extraction, preparation, possession, offering, offer-
ing for sale, distribution, purchase, sale, delivery on any terms
whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch, dispatch in transit, transport,
importation and exportation of drugs contrary to the provisions
of this Convention, and any other action which in the opinion
of such Party may be contrary to the provisions of this Conven-
tion, shall be punishable offences when committed intentionally,
and that serious offences shall be liable to adequate punishment
particularly by imprisonment or other penalties of deprivation
of liberty.' 27
Adherence to this requirement should eventually lead to a fair amount
of similarity among various national laws with respect to the defi-
nition of narcotics offenses. Where this is the case, the characteriza-
tion problem that arises from the dual criminality concept should
diminish considerably for the narcotics area.
2. Characterization and § 1009 Offenses
Even where narcotics crime ultimately becomes defined with a
reasonable amount of specificity and on a fairly uniform basis among
countries, extradition for violations of § 1009 of the Controlled Sub-
stances Import and Export Act may still be something of a problem.
As indicated earlier, 2 8 the unique jurisdictional scope of this par-
123. See p. 715 supra.
124. Single Convention, supra note 44, art. 29(1).
125. Id. art. 30.
126. Id. art. 31(1)(a).
127. Id. art. 36(l).
128. See p. 712 supra.
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ticular section causes it to be applied to activities not normally regu-
lated by most nations. The conceptual problems that § 1009 is likely
to ,present, where dual criminality is concerned, stem from this un-
usual jurisdictional approach.
Since § 1009 operates to proscribe the manufacture and distribu-
tion of narcotics outside the territory of the United States, it may
be viewed by some nations as an approach to narcotics control hav-
ing no counterpart in their criminal law, particularly where the states
involved take a strict territorial view toward penal legislation. Such
an understanding can undoubtedly lead to refusals of extradition re-
quests for § 1009 violations.
The difficulty with this view, although it is no doubt likely to
appear from time to time, is that it fails to separate the jurisdic-
tional aspects of § 1009 from its substantive elements. The fact that
§ 1009 applies to extraterritorial conduct should be irrelevant where
the substantive elements of the crime are concerned, although, as
discussed earlier,1 29 this factor may be quite significant for other
reasons.
Most nations are likely to penalize the unlawful manufacture and
distribution of narcotics, just as § 1009 does, even where they limit
the prohibition solely to territorial offenses. Where this is the case
there is no compelling logical necessity to refuse an extradition re-
quest based on § 1009 merely because the criminal law of a requested
state may be more limited in jurisdictional scope.
While the dual criminality principle serves the important and neces-
sary function of protecting human rights where the societal percep-
tions of criminal systems vary strikingly, 130 adherence to the expecta-
tions underlying such a policy do not require an exact identity of of-
fenses where no real difference in values exists. 131 The standard should
129. See p. 717 supra.
130. For example, certain nations might legalize the consumption and manufacture
of marihuana. If the United States sought extradition of a foreign national manufac-
turing marihuana, even for importation into the United States, the dual criminality
principle could rightly be empowered to bar such extradition.
131. This understanding is underscored when viewed in the context of various other
limitations upon extradition which arise even in cases where the dual criminality
standard is satisfied. For example, the exception for "political crimes" has long been
recognized among states to prohibit extradition even in those instances where the crime
charged is extraditable under the laws of the requested state. See Evans, Reflections
upon the Political Offense in International Practice, 57 Asf. J. INT'L L. 1 (1963); Garcia-
Mora, Present Status of Political Offenses in the Law of Extradition and Asylum, 14
U. Prr. L. REv. 371 (1953). Additionally, the principle of "speciality" normally op-
erates to prohibit extradition from a requested state or to prevent trial in a requesting
state for any offense other than that upon which the extradition request was granted.
A contemporary example of this arose during the recent hearings in the Bahamas on
the United States request for the extradition of Robert Vesco. In deciding against the
extradition of Vesco the Bahamian magistrate presiding over the case hinted that his
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be met where the penal approach of both countries involved is suffi-
ciently similar to equate for extradition purposes the criminal acts
which the laws of each seek to prohibit. Thus, if the substantive ele-
ments of § 1009 are viewed apart from their jurisdictional means, the
type of conduct proscribed by the section ought to be susceptible of
characterization as criminal by most nations having reasonably devel-
oped penal codes. Whether this will in fact occur remains, of course,
a matter of the future.
C. Extradition of Nationals of the Requested State
The final and perhaps most difficult problem area for extradition
stems from the consistent refusal of many nations to extradite their
own citizens. This refusal has a long history.' 32 Prohibitions against
the extradition of nationals are found in the domestic laws of a sig-
nificant number of countries. 133 Only the United States and the
United Kingdom can be said to have persistently refused to adopt
this approach. As a result, most extradition treaties contain clauses
specifically exempting nationals from their operation.
The United States has attempted to avoid such clauses in its ex-
tradition agreements with other governments but has had a notable
lack of success in this regard. Of all the extradition treaties to which
it is a party, only five contain no specific exemption for nationals,
134
refusal to extradite was based in some measure upon a belief that the American govern-
ment was seeking extradition for crimes other than those enumerated in the affidavits
submitted. N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1973, at 1, col. 1. Although the result in the Vesco case
may not be wholly desirable the inquiry on this issue seems in line with protecting
the rights of those sought.
132. The refusal of nations to extradite their own citizens is generally traced by
writers as far back as the fourteenth century Brabantine Bull. In the eighteenth cen-
tury, however, France became a leader in the practice and established the exemption
firmly in civil law thinking. See MOORE, supra note 28, at 152 passim. Perhaps the
most common reason for the practice lies in the fear that citizens of one country will
be at a disadvantage when tried in the courts of another, a fear generally groundless
today. See I. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 118-25 (1971).
133. See examples set out in 6 WHITEMAN, supra note 31, at 865.
134. Agreements with Canada, Ecuador, Italy, Union of South Africa, and United
Kingdom. Under two of these, however, extradition of nationals is at best a difficult
proposition. While the Extradition Treaty with Ecuador, June 28, 1872, 18 Stat. 199
(1875), T.S. No. 79 (effective Dec. 24, 1873), and the Extradition Treaty with Italy, Mar.
23, 1968, 15 Stat. 629 (1869), T.S. No. 174 (effective Sept. 17, 1868) both contain no
exemption for nationals, the domestic laws of each militate against the surrender of
citizens absent a specific obligation to do so. The law of Ecuador provides that
"Ecuador is not under an obligation to surrender its subjects whose extradition is re-
quested .... " Law Concerning Foreigners, Extradition and Naturalization, proclaimed
at Quito, Oct. 18, 1921, art. 41. The law of Italy, on the other hand, provides: "Ex-
tradition of citizens is not granted unless specifically provided for in international
conventions." Penal Code art. 13(4), reprinted in Harvard Research in International
Law, Extradition, supra note 30, at 408.
In a number of previous cases, the Italian government has refused the extradition
of nationals to the United States based on the provision of its law quoted above. For
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and only one, the 1962 agreement with Israel,135 provides categor-
ically that "a requested Party shall not decline to extradite a person
sought because such person is a national of the requested Party."' 36
Thus, in the great majority of cases, the United States is rarely able
to make a successful request for the extradition of a foreign national
from his home country.
None of the treaties to which the United States is a party actually
prohibits the extradition of nationals as some European agreements
do; 137 rather, the exception for nationals in United States agree-
ments is often framed in terms similar to those found in the Extra-
dition Treaty with Brazil: 38
There is no obligation upon the requested State to grant the
extradition of a person who is a national of the requested State,
but the executive authority of the requested State shall, subject
to the appropriate laws of that State, have the power to surrender
a national of that State if, in its discretion, it be deemed proper
to do so.' 39
The discretionary nature of this approach is largely illusory. It is
principally the result of an effort by the United States, which is
generally willing to extradite citizens in appropriate cases, to avoid
the consequences of its inability to do so as a matter of comity. 40
a description of some of these cases see W. RAFUSE, EXTRADMTON OF NATIONALS 93-106
(1939). This difficulty seems to have been ameliorated, however, by an understanding
reached between the United States and Italy in which the Italian government agreed
"to the provision of Article I of the said Convention also being applied, under con-
ditions of reciprocity, to individuals having Italian citizenship." Exchange of Notes
at Rome, April 16 and 17, 1946, 61 Stat. 3687-88 (1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1699 (effective May
1, 1946). The problem raised by the Ecuadorian legislation quoted above has, how-
ever, never been resolved.
135. Extradition Treaty with Israel, Dec. 10, 1962, [1962] 14 U.S.T. 1707, T.I.A.S.
No. 5476 (effective Dec. 5, 1963).
136. Id. art. IV.
137. See, e.g., Extradition Convention between Austria and Israel, Oct. 10, 1961,
art. 2(1), 448 U.N.T.S. 161.
138. Extradition Treaty with Brazil, Jan. 13, 1961, [1963] 15 U.S.T. 2093, T.LA.S.
No. 5691 (effective Dec. 17, 1964).
139. Id. art. VII.
140. Earlier United States extradition treaties, such as that with France, which has
only recently been amended, had provided simply:
Neither of the contracting Parties shall be bound to deliver up its own citizens
or subjects under the stipulations of this convention.
Extradition Treaty with France, Jan. 6, 1903, art. V, 37 Stat. 1526 (1913), T.S. No. 561 (ef-
fective July 26, 1911); amended by Supplementary Convention, February 12, 1970, 22 U.S.T.
407, T.I.A.S. No. 7075 (effective Apr. 3, 1971). This language presented a problem for
the United States in those cases where it might desire to extradite a United States
citizen under such a treaty since the Supreme Court in United States v. Valentine ex -el.
Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936), had viewed the Executive as having no constitutional
power to do so absent a clear statutory or treaty authorization. Id. at 7-8. Thus, the
express grant of discretionary power to extradite nationals found in treaties such as
that with Brazil is principally an attempt to overcome this disability.
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That this discretionary power is likely to be similarly used by foreign
governments party to such agreements is doubtful at best. 141
Regardless of its historical rationale, a blanket nationality excep-
tion is of doubtful value today. Violations of § 1009 may be an
example of why this is true. Since this section is directed principally
toward extraterritorial conduct, it is likely to encompass the activ-
ities of individuals acting in their home states in a sizable number
of instances. If extradition is not available in these cases, the effec-
tiveness of the section is significantly diminished.
One solution that has been offered to the enforcement hiatus
created by the nationality exception is the development of a treaty
approach which establishes a positive obligation on those nations
refusing to extradite nationals to punish such offenders under their
own domestic law.'142 Language which imposes such a prosecutorial
obligation has begun to appear with increasing frequency in extra-
dition agreements between a number of European states.143 Both the
Hague Convention of 1970 on the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 44
and the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs employ this ap-
proach. The Hague Convention is particularly emphatic in this re-
gard. Article 7 of the Convention provides:
The Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged
offender is found shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged,
without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence
was committed in its territory, to submit the case to its com-
petent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Those authori-
ties shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case
of any ordinary offence of a serious nature under the law of that
State.1
45
The principal drawback to this approach, if applied to the drug
field, arises from the current lack of uniformity on the part of na-
tions regarding the nature of conduct punishable as a narcotics of-
fense. This lack of uniformity, coupled with the general reluctance
141. Indeed the constitutional and statutory framework for extradition in most
such countries would preclude any exercise of discretion in this regard.
142. Most nations refusing to extradite their own citizens have statutory authority
to prosecute them under domestic law for criminal acts committed abroad. See, e.g.,
§ 3 of the German Penal Code set out at pp. 719-20 supra. Whether this authority re-
sults in effective prosecution in many cases is, of course, another matter. But see cases
cited in 6 WHrriEAN, supra note 31, at 877-83.
143. See, e.g., Extradition Convention between Austria and Israel, Oct. 10, 1961,
448 U.N.T.S. 161.
144. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16,
1970, [1971] 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192 (effective Oct. 14, 1971).
145. Id. art. 7.
740
Vol. 83: 706, 1974
Traffic in the Traffickers
of states to enforce foreign penal law,146 can cause considerable con-
fusion as to the law to be applied where domestic prosecution of a
foreign offense is desired. Indeed, in some cases, a nation refusing
extradition may be entirely unable to prosecute the conduct involved
for lack of a similar domestic criminal law applicable to such ac-
tivity, even where its penal code purports generally to extend to
the offenses of nationals abroad.
Perhaps in recognition of this problem, the Single Convention did
not adopt for the narcotics area the same sort of rigorous approach
to domestic prosecution of nationals where extradition is refused as
did the Hague Convention. A somewhat more qualified requirement
was utilized:
2. Subject to the constitutional limitations of a Party, its legal
system and domestic law . . . (iv) Serious offences heretofore
referred to committed either by nationals or by foreigners
shall be prosecuted by the Party in whose territory the of-
fence was committed, or by the Party in whose territory the
offender is found if extradition is not acceptable in conformity
with the law of the Party to which application is made, and
if such offender has not already been prosecuted and judg-
ment given.147
Whether this standard will offer much in the way of a solution for
the difficulties caused by the nationality exception remains to be seen.
An alternative means of dealing with the question has been sug-
gested by Dr. Ivan Shearer of the University of Adelaide in a recent
book on extradition problems.' 48 Dr. Shearer's approach would bi-
furcate the extradition process into a two step procedure where na-
tionals of a requested state are involved. Under this method states
adhering to the nationality exception would agree to turn over citi-
zens accused of crimes abroad to requesting states for the limited
purpose of trial and judgment on the offenses charged. Requesting
states, in return, would agree to remit offenders convicted under
this procedure to the home state for execution of any sentence im-
posed.' 4 9 Dr. Shearer explains:
The main purpose of the proposal is to secure to the most
appropriate forum jurisdiction over crime and at the same time
to secure to the most appropriate organs the task of corrective
146. See, e.g., The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825).
147. Single Convention, supra note 44, art. 36(2).
148. See I. SHEARF-R, supra note 132.
149. Id. at 126.
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punishment and rehabilitation. These latter organs, it is sug-
gested, are those of the prisoner's home State.
Despite this basic purpose and philosophy, the fact need not
be disguised that a secondary effect of returning a convicted of-
fender to his home State would be to permit the possibility of
his release from imprisonment in the rare case where a miscar-
riage of justice might be considered to have occurred. It is en-
visaged that treaty provisions would reserve all powers to the
national State after return of the sentenced prisoner, and that
the sentence would be treated in that State in all respects as
though it were a sentence of a competent national court, sub-
ject perhaps to consultation between the authorities of the two
countries. This provision would thus admit the right of the
national State to exercise its executive prerogative of mercy by
way of pardon or partial remission of the penalty, as well as the
right of the national State to apply its own laws and procedures
relating to probation, parole and other corrective and rehabilita-
tive aids. It is suggested that, in this light, many of the objections
presently raised against the extradition of nationals would dis-
appear.1
50
There is a great deal of merit to this suggestion, although it admit-
tedly adds additional time and expense to the process of law en-
forcement. Nevertheless, such a procedure, if available in those cases
where neither outright extradition nor home state prosecution is
possible, could be a substantial beginning toward meaningful co-
operation in the area.
Conclusion
Extradition remains today a fairly unwieldy mechanism. It is ex-
pensive, time consuming, and suffers from a number of highly
formalized and largely outmoded conceptions. Unfortunately, given
the traditional attitude of states toward international criminal law
cooperation, there is little by way of an alternative to the process
that would protect human rights in the imperfect world order we
have. One suggestion that has been advanced, however, particularly
with regard to narcotics offenses, has been the wider use of the
concept of universal penal jurisdiction.
Yet as discussed earlier 15 the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs did not adopt the universality principle as a basis for the
exercise by states of prescriptive competence over the illicit nar-
150. Id. at 127.
151. See pp. 725-26 supra.
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cotics trade. Instead it retained the territorial concept as the pri-
mary means of allocating competence to punish narcotics trafficking
and turned to the device of extradition as the principal tool to as-
sure its effectiveness.
If extradition is to achieve this goal, a number of modifications
of contemporary practice seem advisable. A beginning step in this
regard would be the use of more flexible standards than now exist
in current extradition agreements. This is particularly true with
respect to jurisdictional requirements. Where certain serious crimes
are concerned, new treaties should provide for the surrender of of-
fenders to any nation having an adequate basis in customary in-
ternational law for the application of its penal legislation to the
conduct involved.
Another concept obviously needing a good deal of reevaluation is
the nationality exemption. Whether this exemption is necessary any
longer is certainly open to question. In any case its clearly undesir-
able features should be significantly moderated whenever possible.
Thus, thought must be given to more effective ways to assure the
prosecution of individuals exempt from extradition as a result of
this concept. Perhaps it might be worthwhile to mandate that states
prosecute citizens they refuse to extradite under their own domestic
laws. Dr. Shearer's remedy for the nationality exemption is probably
the most attractive approach to the problem and it should be seriously
considered.
152
Finally, in addition to extradition by treaty, extradition as a matter
of comity should be used more widely. This is clearly true as far as
the United States is concerned. The time has certainly come for a
reevaluation of United States practice in this regard and the prepara-
tion of a new and comprehensive extradition statute would be a good
first step. 1 3
152. See p. 738 supra.
153. Certainly, such an approach is far preferable to that which has been seem-
ingly adopted in recent days by United States policymakers. For example, after the
coup d'6tat by the armed forces in Chile the new government imprisoned a Uruguayan
national, Adolphus Sobocki Tobias, who had been indicted earlier in New York for
illegally conspiring to import narcotic drugs. Nwvswsaic, Dec. 17, 1973, at 38. The
United States-Chilean extradition treaty is very old and narcotics offenses are not
covered. Extradition Treaty with Chile, April 17, 1900, 32 Stat. 1850 (1900), T.S. No.
407 (effective June 26, 1902). It is unclear whether the United States had officially
requested the Allende government to extradite Sobocki on the basis of comity in
derogation of past American practice that required explicit treaty coverage. In any
event Sobocki remained free until the coup. After holding him prisoner for two weeks
the new government deported Sobocki to Uruguay. He was met at the Montevideo
airport by agents of the Uruguayan and American governments and then, apparently
without any attempt to observe normal procedures, was put on a plane to New York
with the American agent. He is now in custody awaiting trial in New York. The
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Until such time as many of the foregoing problem areas have been
adequately treated, the accommodation of various state interests
through the extradition process will remain a difficult proposition.
Thus expansive approaches to narcotics crime such as that found in
§ 1009 of the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act are not
likely to meet with an inordinate amount of success where extradition
is required to secure their enforcement.
presence of the American agent lends some weight to an interpretation of these
events that would indicate that in the case of serious drug offenders the American
government has deserted its long-held view on the strictness with which extradition
matters should be treated.
In addition to Sobocki, it appears that Chile deported five or six other individuals,
not nationals of the United States, to the United States because of pending indict-
ments for drug-related offenses. TIME, Dec. 24, 1973, at 75. This, when coupled with
the difficulties inherent in the extradition process, may indicate a trend away from
formal transnational dealing on the matter of removal for trial. In these two cases,
as in the case of Auguste Ricord with which this article began, there is of course a
smell of "gun-boat" diplomacy. All three governments in Latin America-Chile after
the coup, Uruguay, and Paraguay-have been closely identified with the interests of
the American government.
There can be no doubt that these cases undermine, just as seriously as the cases in
which extradition is denied for technical reasons, efforts to develop an international
law of crimes and eventually an international order more stable than the one we
possess. These cases are ample illustration of the possible conflict between rationaliza-
tion of extradition procedures and protection of human rights. Extradition should
not be granted after deals have been worked out between collaborating chanceries
trying to dump undesirables onto the jurisdiction most anxious to try them. It should
be a part of a world process that adequately protects the human rights of all po-
tential offenders while providing protection of all peoples from what common ex-
pectations and practice have defined as transnational crimes.
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